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Abstract 
The rates of autism diagnoses are increasing, as is the use of technology and online interactions, 
both inside and outside of the classroom. These online interactions frequently include a digital 
representation of the individual, or avatar. Avatars can take a variety of forms and they can 
influence an individual’s perception of the source as well as the message presented (Nowak, Fox, 
& Ranjit, 2015). While research indicates that human-looking avatars increase learning and 
attention in typically developed populations, initial research suggests that this may not be true for 
those with autism (Begum, Serna, & Yanco, 2016; Moore & Calvert, 2000; Parsons & Mitchell, 
2001). The present study will examine the effects of perceived anthropomorphism on 
information processing, for typically developed individuals and those with ASD. Social 
motivation theory predicts that those with ASD will perceive social potential differently than 
their typically developed peers (Chevalier et al., 2017), and this can in turn affect perceptions of 
anthropomorphism, homophily and copresence. Finally, both information processing theory and 
the theory of executive dysfunction predict that differences in perceptions of social potential and 
anthropomorphism can influence instructor satisfaction.  
Keywords: Autism, executive dysfunction, information processing, anthropomorphism, avatars, 
homophily, copresence, instructor satisfaction. 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 Interactions and transactions involving some form of technology are now a common 
occurrence for most people, including both neuro-typical and neuro-diverse individuals, 
specifically those with autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Many of these technologies provide 
individuals with opportunities to interact with others using digital characters. Scientists and 
scholars often refer to these digital characters as avatars. Avatars are “a digital representation of 
a human user that facilitates interaction with other users, entities, or the environment” (Nowak & 
Fox, 2018 pg. 34). Research suggests there are different psychological traits and individual-level 
differences that affect the perception of avatars (McGloin, Nowak & Watt, 2014; Nowak & 
Rauh, 2005; Nowak, Fox, Ranjit, 2015). Individuals that are on the autism spectrum use avatars 
and robot technology to help develop their social skills and attention orientation (Georgescu, 
Kuzmanovic, Roth, Bente, & Vogeley, 2014; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2000). Research on 
typically developed populations has suggested that perceived anthropomorphism, or the 
attribution of human characteristics, can increase perceptions of homophily (Nowak, Hamilton, 
& Hammond, 2009), presence, and message clarity (Nowak et al., 2015). However, previous 
research findings (Begum et al., 2016; Grynszpan, Martin & Nadel, 2008; Moore & Calvert, 
2000; Parsons & Mitchell, 2001) and the theories of executive dysfunction and social motivation 
suggest that those with ASD process these digital entities differently from typically developed 
individuals.  
Those with ASD characteristically process information differently than their typically 
developed peers (Carter, Williams, Hodgins, & Lehman, 2014; Jarrold, et al., 2013; Moore, 
Cheng, McGrath, & Powell, 2005; Parsons, 2016), and this influences how they use and react to 
technology (Carter et al, 2014; Jarrold, et al., 2013; Moore et al., 2005; Parsons, 2016). 
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Furthermore, when individuals with ASD are presented with information in a mediated context, 
it can positively affect their performance outcomes (Jarrold, et al., 2013; Parsons, 2016), 
attention (Carter et al, 2014), social skills (Moore et al., 2005) and decision-making. However, as 
a social information training tool, multimedia interfaces (text with dynamic, animated avatars) 
were less effective as a training tool for those with ASD than simple interfaces (text with 
pictures) (Grynszpan et al., 2008).  
           When persons with ASD interact with digital characters (Georgescu et al., 2014) and text 
chat, they feel more confident than they do offline in their ability to communicate, and they are 
better able to discern social cues (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2000). Nonetheless, when presented 
with several variations of robots and avatars, in face-to-face and mediated interactions, those 
with ASD preferred non-human like characters and robots to more human-like characters 
(Begum et al., 2016; Parsons & Mitchell, 2001). Thus, it is important to consider individual 
differences and the end-users needs when it comes to developing and applying this technology 
(Begum et al., 2016).   
           Mediated communication can be effective, but the effectiveness can vary with the type of 
digital character. While several studies have included digital characters based on what the 
researcher perceives to be a more humanlike character, or their opinions of anthropomorphism 
(Chaminade et al., 2015; Kristen, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; Sartorato, Przybylowski, & Sarko, 
2017), but they have not explicitly measured a participant’s perceptions of anthropomorphism. 
Therefore, this project will measure perceptions of anthropomorphism, and the unique reactions 
of those with ASD to anthropomorphism as compared to a typically developed population. 
Furthermore, this study will test how differences in perceived anthropomorphism affect 
perceptions of the source of the message (affective content) or satisfaction with the instructor. 
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           The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2014 report indicates that one in every 
six children (aged 6 to 17) will be diagnosed with one or more developmental disability, such as 
attention deficit disorder (ADD), autism spectrum disorders (ASD), learning disabilities, hearing 
or vision loss, etc. The rate of autism spectrum disorders (ASD) increased by 119.4 percent since 
2000 (1 in 150) to 2010 (1 in 68) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014), and this 
trend is likely to continue. While little research in communication and education has addressed 
the unique needs of this population, almost half of the individuals identified on the autism 
spectrum have average to above-average intellectual abilities (CDC, 2014), and are likely to be 
included in the college and university population. Thus, it is important for researchers and 
educators to consider how they use these digital characters for teaching those with ASD.   
           According to the CASA (computers as social actors’ framework) framework, individuals 
will process virtual entities similarly to offline entities (Nowak et al., 2015; Reeves & Nass, 
1996). Therefore, it is vital to understand the underlying factors that influence the variance in 
perceptions of the same digital characters across individuals (Nowak et al., 2015). Thus, this 
research will test several relationships: i) investigate the relationship between ASD and 
responses to anthropomorphism when viewing human and non-human instructors ii) investigate 
the relationship between anthropomorphism, homophily, and perceptions of self and other-
copresence for typically developed persons and those with ASD, and iii) the impact of these 
variables on and attitudes toward the instructor. The paper includes a discussion of the 
differences in information processing for typically developed individuals and those with ASD. 
Finally, the paper will address the theoretical and practical implications of the results for 
researchers and designers of educational technology, with particular attention paid to designing 
systems for those with ASD.       
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Chapter II: Literature Review 
Information Processing Theory and Executive Dysfunction 
Models and theories predicting the differences individuals experience processing and 
reacting to messages focus primarily on factors related to attention and comprehension of a 
message (Hamilton & Nowak, 2005; McGuire, 1968; Miller, 2011). Information processing 
theories and models examine the flow of information. Information processing involves multiple 
stages, and the process begins with some input or information that may or may not be lost at any 
point during processing (Miller, 2011). Universally, these theories argue that an individual’s 
mental processing capacity is finite and limits their ability to attend to message content 
(Baddeley, 2000; Munakata, 2006; Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). These theoretical models 
make two main predictions: i) people are limited in both the speed and amount of information 
that they attended to and, ii) thinking is a flexible process (Miller, 2011; Siegler & Alibali, 
2005). Humans inherently have a limited capacity and speed at which they can attend to and 
process information simultaneously (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). Therefore, individuals adapt 
and allocate resources to control the flow of information based on what they perceive to be 
relevant and essential stimuli (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968; Siegler & Alibali, 2005). The 
primary factor influencing comprehension is attention and how one chooses to control the 
allocation of their limited resources (Hamilton, 1997; Miller, 2011). 
           Information processing theories posit that there is a positive correlation between an 
individual’s ability to attend to and comprehend content, and the impact of the message’s effect 
(Hamilton & Nowak, 2005; Miller, 2011). Thus, individuals must first be compelled to allocate 
their attention to a message and a source so that information can be used in future situations or 
decisions. The channel (e.g., video, audio, face-to-face) one uses, message content, and 
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individual receiver level differences in attention and comprehension all affect changes related to 
perception, attitude, and opinion of a source or message (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). People 
respond to technology with similar categorical responses that they might have to offline entities. 
Thus, computer users will assign social rules and expectations to a computer or stimuli that 
appear responsive and shows intelligence and emotion (Nowak et al., 2009; Nass & Moon, 
2000). The assignment of these human categories is an example of perceptions of social 
potential. Accordingly, information-processing theory posits that individuals pay more attention 
to sources they see as dynamic or having greater social potential (McGuire, 1968). Attention 
allocated to the source of the message could be a distraction for some learners and take away 
from the resources they have to evaluate a message. 
The information-processing model begins with a message or problem that requires 
attention and ends with a person drawing some conclusion about the information presented, or 
storing it in long-term memory (Miller, 2011). During the first stage of information processing, 
message exposure, yielding or attention to the message, and possible comprehension of the 
content may occur (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). During the second stage, an individual may 
evaluate both the source and the message content (McGuire, 1968). Information processing 
theories hypothesize that as a person’s knowledge increases, so does their involvement in a topic. 
Involvement in the topic can lead to a more significant change in behaviors or attitudes 
(McGuire, 1968; Hamilton & Nowak, 2005). However, individuals have a fixed and limited 
capacity to process this information, and in order for yielding to occur, individuals must be able 
to inhibit attention to irrelevant stimuli (Miller, 2011; McGuire, 1968). Furthermore, individuals 
are motivated by “enduring dispositions or innate unconscious rules” as to how they will allocate 
these resources (Lachman, Butterfield, & Butterfield, 1979). However, many individual 
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differences influence this process, and the responses are different for individuals with issues 
related to executive function, such as those with ASD (Rajendran et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 
2009). 
Autism Spectrum Disorders and Executive Dysfunction 
The theory of executive dysfunction focuses on the difficulties that an individual faces 
with tasks such as initiating, sustaining, shifting, inhibition, and stopping (Rajendran & Mitchell, 
2007). Planning, decision-making, judgment, and self-perception abilities relate to these specific 
executive dysfunctions and those diagnosed with ASD (Landry & Taie, 2016; Miyake et al. 
2000; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Taken together with the limited resources that individuals 
have available for processing information, individuals that experience problems with these 
specific executive functions are at a marked disadvantage. Therefore, when individuals have 
trouble with these specific executive functions, and they are processing multiple streams of 
information targeted at affective content (a source), and task information (the message), they 
may struggle with shifting between the two streams of information. 
           Many individuals with ASD have trouble with specific executive functions, such as 
mental flexibility and self-monitoring (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). These functions 
correspond to an individual’s planning, decision-making, and judgment skills, as well as their 
self-perception (Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). Accordingly, the theory of executive dysfunction 
predicts that individuals who have trouble with attention switching, and those with highly 
focused interests, will also have trouble in planning, mental flexibility, inhibition, and self-
monitoring (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). Therefore, when individuals with ASD struggle 
with attention switching and mentalizing, they may have problems shifting their attention 
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between information directed at the source and content directed at understanding new 
information (Palmer, Paton, Enticott, & Hohway, 2014).   
           Cognitive overload and information processing theories posit that individuals not only 
have a limited capacity for processing information but in the presence of competing stimuli, no 
single message will receive sufficient attention for processing (McGuire, 1968; Jeong & 
Fishbein, 2007; Mayer & Moreno, 2003; Junco, 2012). When a person encounters more 
information than their processing capacity can manage, some of the information may not be 
comprehended (Miller, 2011). Thus, when persons with ASD are engaged in processing both 
task information (a message) and affective content (the avatar,) they may not process the 
information as effectively as typically developed individuals. 
Executive dysfunction and attention switching. Many individuals with ASD struggle 
with attention switching. Persons that struggle with attention switching have trouble 
remaining on task and focusing when trying to attend to multiple sources of information or 
stimuli. Those with attention switching problems cannot self-monitor. Self- monitoring helps 
individuals direct their attention to the essential information and disregard the less essential 
stimuli. Thus, those that struggle with this particular executive function are unable to inhibit 
themselves from paying attention to distractions or to information that is not relevant, and they 
fight to return their focus if they are distracted. Essentially, this means that people who struggle 
with attention switching have difficulty maintaining focus and adjusting behavior when alternate 
competing information is present (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009), and they experience greater 
difficulty than their typically developed peers do when moving from one task to the other (Hill, 
2004; Rajendran et al., 2011). Therefore, when individuals with ASD are processing an avatar 
that they find difficult to process, they may struggle with staying on task and processing the 
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message. The competing streams of information may also reduce the satisfaction a person 
experiences in a learning environment, or satisfaction with the instructor.  
           Executive dysfunction and mentalizing. The ability to take into account your mental 
state as well as the mental state of others is the ability to mentalize (Rajendran & Mitchell, 
2007). Those with ASD often struggle with their ability to discern the mental states of others. 
Avatars perceived as more humanlike, responsive, or those that show emotion or intelligence, are 
viewed as having greater social potential (Nowak et al., 2015; Nowak et al., 2009). Mentalizing 
requires processing information about the social potential of an interaction partner. Individuals 
tend to invest more resources in processing avatars that they deem higher in social potential 
(Nowak et al., 2009). Therefore, individuals that struggle with mentalizing may struggle more 
than typically developed persons when processing an avatar that has greater social potential. 
           The overarching central assumption of information processing is that attention is a 
primary factor in understating (McGuire, 1968; Miller, 2011; Hamilton, 1997). Typically-
developed individuals can move easily from one task to another and will devote attention to the 
more difficult task. However, individuals with ASD typically struggle when moving fluidly from 
one task to another, and will struggle more with controlling the flow of information and 
allocating the appropriate level of resources (Mackinlay, Charman & Karmiloff-Smith, 2006; 
Rajendran et al., 2011; Logie, Trawley, & Law, 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar, 2009). A 
source that is higher in social potential may serve as more of a distraction for those with ASD. 
The visual/social information from the avatar may serve as a competing stream of information 
for those that struggle with mentalizing. Participants that struggle with discerning the mental 
states of others may find an avatar that is higher in social potential difficult to process. Therefore, 
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increased anthropomorphism may serve as a distraction for those that express difficulty with 
mentalizing, and taken together, and this may reduce satisfaction with the instructor.  
Executive dysfunction and social abilities. Those who struggle with mentalizing and 
attention switching may also struggle with social skills and social cognition, including processes 
that aid in the understanding of others (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 
2001; Happé, Cook & Bird, 2017). These processes include but are not limited to, the quantity of 
social interaction, emotion recognition, empathy, the degree of attention paid to social stimuli 
(Happé et al., 2017). Persons that experience trouble with social skills tend to focus more on the 
self and less on engaging with others (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). Therefore, some individuals 
with ASD tend to engage in repetitive and restricted communication (Woodbury-Smith & 
Volkmar, 2009).  
 Fixation on certain social cues or tasks, and the restricted way in which some individuals 
with ASD communicate may inhibit their processing. Avatars provide a person with information 
about the interaction partner, and a person’s perception of the avatar can influence later social 
judgments (Blascovich & Bailenson, 2011; Hamilton & Nowak, 2010; Nowak, Watt, & Walther, 
2009; Nowak & Fox, 2018). Even when individuals interact with static two-dimensional images, 
the more human they perceive the image to be, the more they see it as having social potential 
(Hamilton & Nowak, 2010; Nowak et al., 2009). Thus, individuals with diminished social skills 
may find processing a human-looking avatar more challenging than a less human-looking avatar. 
Therefore, when tasked with processing the avatar along with an informative message, those 
with communication or social skills problems may experience more difficulty in making source 
attributions than their typically developed peers may.  
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CASA and Social Potential 
According to the computers as social actor's (CASA) framework, individuals will apply 
the same perception process to mediated stimuli that they would offline stimuli or persons 
(Reeves & Nass, 1996; Nowak & Rauh, 2008; Nowak et al., 2015). The CASA framework posits 
that when individuals interact with one another, it is "fundamentally social and natural" (Reeves 
& Nass, 1996, p. 5), whether online or offline. The first stage in perceiving a digital 
representation, or avatar, is determining anthropomorphism, "agency or humanity" (Nowak & 
Fox, 2018). People typically feel a stronger connection with avatars that visually represent a 
human, and this can also lead to perceptions of greater social potential (Nowak et al., 2015; 
Nowak & Fox, 2018). However, when atypical individuals, with social skill impairments, are 
processing affective and task-related content with an avatar that they perceive as more human, 
they may be distracted by social potential. As a result, they may be unable to provide adequate 
attention to both task and affective content, and involvement and working memory may be 
impaired. One influential variable in the perception of social potential is the perception of 
anthropomorphism, or humanness (Nowak & Fox, 2018). Therefore, understanding what 
variables influence the source perception process is vital in constructing a positive learning 
environment. 
           Anthropomorphism is the perception of the appearance or behavioral attributes of humans 
(Nowak, 2004; Nowak & Biocca, 2003). Anthropomorphism is a concept frequently used in 
avatar research with typically developed populations. The perception of humanness or 
anthropomorphism can influence perceptions of social potential (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak & 
Fox, 2018). Furthermore, there are variations in the effects of anthropomorphism across the 
literature. In some instances, more anthropomorphic avatars have been deemed less credible and 
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likable (Mull, Wyss, Moon & Lee, 2014; Nowak, 2004), while others have found more 
anthropomorphic images to be more likable and credible (Bengtsson, Burgoon, Cederberg, 
Bonito, & Lundeberg, 1999; Khan & Sutcliffe, 2014; Luo, McGoldrick, Beatty, & Keeling, 
2006; Nowak & McGloin, 2014; Wexelblat, 1998).  
           The differences in perceptions of anthropomorphism, and its effects, may relate to factors 
such as previous experience, personality, and other biases. As discussed above, typically-
developed people tend to prefer anthropomorphic avatars, but this does not apply to everyone. 
Studies suggest that people on the autism spectrum prefer less anthropomorphic or even 
zoomorphic animal avatars to anthropomorphic avatars in online learning environments (Carter 
et al., 2014; Baron-Cohen, Golan, & Ashwin, 2009). Therefore, greater social potential may not 
be a positive attribute for those with ASD. The next section discusses how the social motivation 
theory of autism explains that deficits in social abilities and mentalizing that may account for the 
preference for less anthropomorphic characters (Chevalier et al., 2017). 
Anthropomorphism and ASD 
Anthropomorphism is comprised of two motivational mechanisms, effectance, and 
sociality (Epely, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). Effectance is the motivation to interact effectively 
with non-human agents, and the ability for the interaction to enhance one's predictions of the 
stimuli's behavior in the present and future (Epely et al., 2007). The anxiety or uncertainty one 
feels about the interaction can influence the degree to which people tend to anthropomorphize a 
non-human agent (Epely et al., 2007). Sociality refers to the motivation that a person has to 
establish social connections with other humans (Epely et al., 2007). Individuals may perceive a 
non-human agent as more anthropomorphic when they feel a lack of social connection to humans 
and less anthropomorphic when they feel a strong sense of social connection (Epely et al., 2007). 
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Additionally, when individuals with ASD process information from a non-human agent, 
they may feel less anxiety about the interaction and a stronger social connection.   
The social motivation theory of autism posits that both psychological and biological mechanisms 
drive individuals to orient toward social interaction and to seek social reward (Chevalier et al., 
2017). Thus, individuals prefer engaging in social interaction and typically find that interaction 
rewarding. However, some individuals with ASD are not as motivated as their typically 
developed peers are when engaging in social interaction, and they struggle with interpreting 
social cues and mentalizing (Chevalier et al., 2017). Furthermore, interactions with avatars that 
have lower social potential may provide those with social and mentalizing deficits the benefit of 
simplified social cues and less social stimulations (Chevalier et al., 2017: Scassellati, Admoni & 
Mataric, 2012). Therefore, those with less social motivation will experience an overall decrease 
in the attentional effort they put forth to interpreting social situations than typically developed 
persons.  
Based on the social motivation theory of autism and the motivational mechanisms 
discussed, a person's social skills and mentalizing ability may affect perceptions of 
anthropomorphism. Thus, when individuals struggle more with social interactions and 
mentalizing, they will perceive the animal cartoon as more anthropomorphic than those that 
score higher in social skills and mentalizing. The following research questions are included.  
RQ1: Will people's social skills moderate how anthropomorphic they perceive the 
avatars?  
RQ2: Will people's mentalizing abilities moderate how anthropomorphic they perceive 
the avatars?  
13 
 
           Previous research on the influence of avatars has also considered the importance of 
homophily in the perception process (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak & Rauh, 2005). Homophily 
can positively influence the salience of certain attitudes, value judgments, or heuristics, and this 
can subsequently affect the formation of perceptions (Kennedy-Lightsey, Madlock, Horan & 
Booth-Butterfield, 2008). Furthermore, homophily increases one's confidence in predicting 
behaviors (Rimal, Lapinski, Cook, & Real, 2005; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001; 
Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmor, 2009).  
Homophily and ASD 
Psychological homophily is an expression of similarity between a source and a receiver 
through like qualities with an individual or group rather than heterogeneous individuals (Yuan & 
Gay, 2006; McCroskey, Richmond & Daly, 1975). Previous research indicates that homophily is 
a multidimensional construct concerned with perceived similarity (Yuan & Gay, 2006; 
McCroskey et al., 1975). Furthermore, greater homophily can lead to a sense of effective 
communication based on perceived similarities (Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2008). 
           Homophily can positively influence the connection one feels toward an individual or 
group and the attitudes they possess (Rimal et al., 2005; McPherson et al., 2001). The greater the 
sense of likeness, the more pleasant, influential, and frequent interactions will be (Prisbell & 
Andersen, 1980). Homophily can influence formed attitudes, and therefore, a stronger 
connection to an individual will facilitate stronger like attitudes (Aubrey, Behm-Morawitz & 
Kim, 2014; Rimal et al., 2005; McPherson et al., 2001). The stronger the connection, the more 
confident one is in making predictions about future behavior. As such, predictability allows 
individuals to more readily process interactions and reduce apprehension (Ibarra, 1992). 
McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly (1975) found that the more homophily a receiver feels toward 
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a source, the more communication is likely to occur and be effective. Homophily can also 
influence heuristics, or the mental scripts, that influence the formation of perceptions (Kennedy-
Lightsey et al., 2008). Thus, when individuals are involved in an online interaction where they 
perceive the other to be more like themselves, they may feel their communication is more 
productive (Ibarra, 1992; Kennedy-Lightsey et al., 2008; Rourke & McGloin, 2019). Therefore, 
perceptions of anthropomorphism will positively influence the degree to which an individual 
feels the avatar is similar to them. 
H1: Anthropomorphism will positively predict perceptions of homophily.  
           The implications of perceived similarities within a group and toward an individual are 
vast and applied in a variety of contexts by both mass and interpersonal scholars. Research 
examining the use of avatars includes the concept of homophily and the impact of perceived 
similarity to determine network ties and processes. Additionally, for typically developed 
participants, perceptions of anthropomorphism significantly predict their perceptions of 
homophily (Nowak et al., 2009; Nowak & Rauh, 2005). However, based on the theory of 
executive dysfunction for those that struggle with social skills and mentalizing, a more 
anthropomorphic avatar may decrease perceptions of homophily. Therefore, social skills and 
mentalizing will moderate the effect of anthropomorphism on homophily. Atypical individuals 
may feel a weaker connection with an avatar they perceive to be more anthropomorphic, and this 
can facilitate decreased homophily.  
H2a: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less homophily when 
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on social skills. 
H2b: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less homophily when 
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
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Mediated communication research frequently cites presence, or the lack thereof, as an 
essential concept and predictor of communication satisfaction. Presence can be defined as a 
perception that one has of “being there” and can refer to a psychological connection that one 
feels with another person (Nowak & Biocca, 2003). Presence is also frequently cited as a 
significant predictor of student-teacher satisfaction (Richardson, Maeda, Lv, & Caskurlu, 2017; 
Russo & Benson, 2005; Swan & Shih, 2005) and positive learning outcomes (Elwood et al., 
2014; Garrison, Cleveland-Innes, & Fung, 2010; Hostetter & Busch, 2006; Kehrwald, 2008; 
Richardson et al., 2017; Swan & Shih, 2005; Wei & Chen, 2012) for typically developed 
students.  
Copresence and ASD 
 Copresence is a dimension of presence that focuses on the sense that individuals feel they 
can perceive others and the extent to which they feel that others can actively perceive them 
(Biocca, Harms, & Burgoo, 2004; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Sung & Mayer, 
2012). Furthermore, copresence indicates a sense of being together and a "psychological 
connection of minds" (Biocca, Harms, & Burgoo, 2004; Bulu, 2012; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak, 
2001; Sung & Mayer, 2012). Thus, the term copresence refers explicitly to a psychological 
connection that one feels with another person (Nowak & Biocca, 2003), and does not require the 
feeling that the user is inside or present in the medium. Additionally, when individuals interact 
with an avatar that they feel a similarity, too, this can positively influence the connection that 
they feel, and copresence can increase. Therefore, when individuals experience a greater sense of 
homophily, they may also feel that the avatar is more salient or copresent.  
           Research in copresence indicates that measuring copresence necessitates two measures, 
one measure targeting their perceptions of the interaction partners' involvement (other-
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copresence), and their involvement in the interaction (Nowak, 2001). Additionally, other-
copresence and self-copresence are reciprocal constructs, and in typically developed populations, 
perceived other-copresence increases self-copresence (Nowak et al., 2009). Persons that 
experience the partner more in the interaction also feel more present themselves. Thus, when a 
participant feels the instructor is more involved in the interaction, the participant will also feel 
increased involvement in the interaction.  
H3: Participants that perceive higher anthropomorphism will report more other-
copresence than participants who perceive less anthropomorphism.  
However, this same pattern may not replicate with atypical populations. Based on 
theories of information processing, typically developed individuals and atypical individuals are 
limited in both the speed and amount of information that they can attend to (Miller, 2011; Siegler 
& Alibali, 2005). Furthermore, information-processing theories posit that a set of known but 
unconscious rules guide where individuals choose to allocate their attention (Lachman et al., 
1979). However, as indicated by the theory of executive dysfunction, this process is more 
challenging for individuals with issues related to executive function, such as those with ASD. 
Thus, those with ASD will struggle more when faced with processing multiple streams of 
information, such as the source (affective content) and content directed at perceived cognitive 
learning (task content). Therefore, increased other- copresence may not produce the same 
positive effect on self-copresence for those with ASD that it does for typically developed 
populations.  
The differences in social abilities and mentalizing may account for the difficulty that 
those with ASD experience in processing avatars that are more anthropomorphic. Persons with 
ASD tend to focus more on the self and less on engaging with others. Thus, the lack of social 
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motivation to engage the other, or relate to the others feelings, can inhibit an individual's ability 
or desire to experience a sense of involvement or perceptions of other-copresence. Individuals 
that struggle with social skills and mentalizing that interact with a more anthropomorphic avatar 
may feel challenged in interpreting social cues and be less interested in engaging or feeling 
other-copresence. Therefore, individuals that express more difficulty with attention switching, 
social skills, and mentalizing will also express decreased perceptions of other-copresence. 
H4a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less other-
copresence when perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that that score lower 
on attention switching.   
H4b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less other-copresence when 
perceived anthropomorphism higher than those that score lower on social skills. 
H4c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less other-copresence when 
anthropomorphism is high than those that score lower on mentalizing.   
Executive dysfunction and self-copresence 
 Based on the theory of executive dysfunction and information processing, when 
individuals with ASD are processing both an avatar and a message, they will struggle more than 
typically developed individuals. Thus, individuals with ASD will struggle with focusing on and 
their involvement, or self-copresence, in a mediated interaction.  
Attention switching and self-copresence. As described above, those who struggle with 
attention switching find processing multiple streams of information, such as an avatar and task 
content, more challenging than their typically developed peers do. Additionally, inhibition and 
self-monitoring are what help an individual to stay on task when competing streams of 
information are present (Hill, 2004; Robinson et al., 2009). Attention switching is directly related 
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to one's self-monitoring and inhibition, and as a result, individuals with ASD may experience 
difficulty moving from one task to another (Hill, 2004; Rajendran et al., 2011). Accordingly, 
when individuals with ASD are processing an avatar that they cannot or do not wish to connect 
with (other-copresence), they may struggle with staying on task and processing the message. 
However, individuals with ASD prefer animals to humans, and this may be because they may 
find them more predictable and less distracting (Scassellati et al., 2012), making them feel 
increased self-copresence. Therefore, individuals with ASD will perceive the interaction as less 
effective and desire to be less engaged when the source has high social potential or is highly 
other-copresent; this will make them want to retreat and may decrease self-copresence.  
H5: Other-copresence will positively predict self-copresence.  
H6a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less self-copresence 
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention switching. 
Social skills and self-copresence. Typically developed people feel greater self-
copresence when they can experience other-copresence or that the other is more involved in the 
interaction (Biocca et al., 2004; Bulu, 2012; Kehrwald, 2008; Nowak, 2001; Sung & Mayer, 
2012). However, as stated earlier, individuals with ASD characteristically struggle with social 
interactions and taking another's perspective (Klin, McPartland & Volkmar, 2005; Woodbury-
Smith & Volkmar, 2009), which is predicted by CASA to transfer over to digital others. The 
difficulty that those with ASD experience in perspective-taking can inhibit perceptions of other-
copresence and then subsequently reduce their sense of involvement in the interaction.  
           Individuals with ASD tend to prefer interactions with digital others that are animals rather 
than human. The desire to interact with these less human-like social avatars may provide those 
with social skills deficits fewer social cues to interpret and thereby a less stressful interaction 
19 
 
(Chevalier et al., 2017: Scassellati et al., 2012). Participants that express difficulty with 
interpreting social cues will feel less connected to the instructor when they are interacting with 
an avatar that they perceive as having greater social potential. Increased other-copresence should 
increase self-copresence (Nowak et al., 20090. However, this pattern will not be the same for 
those that do not excel at interpreting social cues. Participants that interact with a high 
anthropomorphic avatar will feel less other-copresence, and thus, self-copresence will be lower.  
H6b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less self-copresence when 
other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills. 
             Mentalizing and self-copresence. Mentalizing or mental flexibility is a person's ability 
to move from one task to another, and switching between the two sets of rules related to multiple 
stimuli (Hill, 2004; Hill & Bird, 2006; Robinson et al., 2009; Mackinlay et al., 2006). Typically-
developed persons move fluidly between affective and task-related content and can devote 
attention to more relevant stimuli when more than one stream of information is present. 
However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction those that struggle with mentalizing, or 
mental flexibility, may have difficulty controlling the flow of information from multiple sources 
(Mackinlay et al., 2006; Rajendran et al., 2011; Logie et al., 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar, 
2009). Moreover, individuals can become fixed on one task and find it hard to move to another 
when they experience trouble with mental flexibility.  
           When processing an avatar and other stimuli, such as a message, there are competing 
streams of information, and this can make controlling attention difficult. As a result, when 
individuals with ASD that struggle with mentalizing and mental flexibility view information 
from a source that has greater social potential and is more present (other copresence), this creates 
a challenge for allocating resources and makes the person want to retreat and thereby reduce self 
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copresence. Individuals with mentalizing and mental flexibility deficits may find an avatar that is 
less present, and with less social needs more predictable (Scassellati et al., 2012). Therefore, 
participants that express difficulty with mentalizing may find an instructor more connected to 
them distracting, and this may reduce their desire to be involved in the interaction.  
H6c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less self-copresence when 
other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing 
Self-Copresence, Other-Copresence and Perceived Instructor Satisfaction 
 The concept of presence is cited as an important variable in perceived learning 
effectiveness and instructor satisfaction for typically developed populations (Lyons, Reysen, & 
Pierce, 2012; Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). The 
conceptualization of social presence captures the degree to which a person feels their interaction 
partner can create a sense of intimacy and involvement in an interaction (Short, Williams, 
&Christie, 1976). Increased presence is linked to greater media satisfaction (Nowak et al., 2009), 
learning interaction satisfaction (Wei & Chen, 2012), less stress in online tasks (Weinel et al., 
2011), perceptions of better learning performance (Lyons et al., 2012; Richardson et al., 2017; 
Swan & Shih, 2005), and instructor satisfaction (Richardson et al., 2017; Swan & Shih, 2005). 
Thus, when individuals experience a greater sense of social presence, they also feel greater 
satisfaction.  
Greater satisfaction with the learning interaction and the instructor can influence 
retention, student motivation, persistence, and success (Booker & Rebman, 2005; Kuo, Walker, 
Belland, & Schroder, 2013; Pike, 1993; Roberts & Styron, 2010; Schreiner & Nelson, 2013). 
However, the items used to operationalize the concept of social presence infer more about a 
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person's satisfaction with the medium, and less about the salience of the interaction partner 
(Nowak & Biocca, 2003; Nowak et al., 2009). 
The concept or sense of social presence can also be conceptualized as a dual construct 
that captures partners in involvement in an interaction (other-copresence) and a participant's 
sense of involvement in the interaction (self-copresence) (Nowak, 2001). Self and other 
copresence are two distinct measures that capture a participant's feelings of psychological 
involvement. Other-copresence indicates the degree to which a participant feels a connection to 
their interaction partner, and self-copresence is about a participant's involvement in the 
interaction (Nowak, 2001). Thus, based on the previous findings, increased other copresence and 
self-copresence should facilitate greater instructor satisfaction (Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012; 
Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). However, 
individuals that have trouble with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing may be 
better able to learn and pay attention when they feel less self-copresence, and this may result in 
increased satisfaction when their perceptions of involvement are lower. Therefore, less self-
copresence may serve as a positive predictor of teaching satisfaction for those with ASD.  
H7: Self-copresence will positively predict instructor satisfaction.   
H8a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor 
satisfaction when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention 
switching. 
H8b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction 
when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills. 
H8c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction 
when self-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing.  
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Typically developed individuals express greater satisfaction in online learning 
environments when they feel their instructor is involved (Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012; Wei & 
Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & Malzahn, 2011). However, individuals that 
have trouble with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing may be better able to learn 
and pay attention when they feel their instructor is less involved in their interaction. Therefore, 
decreased other-copresence may result in increased satisfaction when those with mentalizing, 
social skills, and attention switching difficulty feel less other-copresence. Therefore, less other-
copresence may serve as a positive predictor of teaching satisfaction for those with ASD. 
H9: Other-copresence will positively predict instructor effectiveness.   
H10a: Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor 
satisfaction when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on attention 
switching. 
H10b: Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction 
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on social skills.            
H10c: Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction 
when other-copresence is higher than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
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CHAPTER III: METHODS 
Design and Procedure 
 
  This study adopted a quasi-experimental, posttest-only two-group design. First, all of the 
subjects took the AQ (the autism spectrum quotient) and answered some basic demographic 
questions. The experiment included random assignment into one of two conditions. The source 
of the message in the first condition was a cartoon dolphin avatar (dolphin=1), and in the second 
condition was a human (male) cartoon avatar (human=2) (See Appendix A). The human and the 
dolphin avatar were dynamic, and they read a script aloud about the Environment Protection Act 
(EPA) (Appendix B) to the participants. Finally, when the avatar finished the presentation, 
participants completed the remaining survey questions about the variables of interest. 
Study Sample 
The participants for this study were all male and recruited from three sources. The 
typically developed participants were recruited through a Qualtrics participant pool (n = 198). 
The participants with ASD were recruited from two sources, an ASD Facebook group (n = 150) 
and the Interactive Autism Network (IAN) (n = 68). All of the participants received an Amazon 
gift card for their participation. Additionally, all of the ASD participants indicated they had 
received a clinical diagnosis of ASD from a trained professional.  
Recent research in ASD has identified a potential male bias in the diagnostic tools used to 
capture this disorder (Loomes, Hull, & Mandy, 2017; Ratto et al., 2017). Previous research 
studies estimate that males are four times more likely to receive an ASD diagnosis over females 
(Ratto et al., 2017). However, a recent meta-analysis indicates that males are approximately three 
times more likely to qualify for a diagnosis, and these diagnostic tools are more likely to miss 
females (Loomes et al., 2017) Thus, the current tools available for non-clinical application are 
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not designed to address the differences in the presentation of this disorder for females. Therefore, 
this research examined the differences only within the male population, as males will be more 
likely to score on the AQ measures than females. The participants recruited were males between 
the ages of 18-25. These criteria helped to circumvent the gender bias inherent in the AQ and 
best represent college-aged students. The initial sample included 416 male participants. After 
removing incomplete responses and participants that did not qualify (n=14), a sample of 402 
responses were retained in the final sample. There were 199 male participants in the dolphin 
cartoon condition and 204 in the human cartoon condition. 
The majority of the participants identified as completing varying degrees of college 
education: 36.1% (n = 146), Bachelor’s degree 19.3% (n = 78), Master’s degree 2.7% (n = 11) or 
having their high school diploma 32.7% (n = 132). The remaining participants indicated that they 
had completed their general education diploma (GED): 9.2% (n = 37).The ethnical composition 
of the study was 51.2 % Caucasians (n = 207), 21 % African American (n = 85), 13.6 % 
Hispanic (n = 55), 8.9% Asian (n = 36), 2.7 % other (n = 11), and 2.5% Native American (n = 
10).  
Study Stimuli 
Pilot test 
The pilot test included four avatars. The test included measures of perceived 
anthropomorphism and realism. The pilor test ncluded 183 participants from two communication 
courses at a large Northeastern University. The sample included 44 percent males (N=82) and 54 
percent females (N=101). The participants first viewed still images of a human cartoon avatar 
and then three animal cartoon avatars: a dolphin, a manatee, or a gorilla (See Appendix C). The 
participants rated each of the avatars on perceptions of anthropomorphism and realism. The 
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scales used were 7-point Likert scales (See Appendix D). The participants all saw the human 
avatar first, and each of the three animal cartoons appeared in random order.  
           To test the differences in anthropomorphism and realism, a between-subjects ANOVA 
was conducted to compare the animal avatars and the human. The analysis of variance for 
anthropomorphism showed that the effect of anthropomorphism was significant at the p < .001 
level for the four conditions, F(3,714) = 513.1, p = .000 (See table 1). Post hoc analyses (See 
Table 2) using the Fishers LSD post hoc criterion for significance indicated that the mean 
difference was significantly higher in the dolphin avatar condition (M = 3.70) than in the 
manatee (M = 3.14) or the gorilla condition (M = 2.62).  
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Next, a one-way between-subject ANOVA compared the animal avatars on perceptions 
of realism. The analysis of variance for realism showed that the effect of realism was significant 
at the p < .001 level for the four conditions F(3,704) = 336.7, p = .000. Post hoc analyses (See 
Table 3) using the Fishers LSD post hoc criterion for significance indicated that realism was 
significantly higher in the manatee avatar condition (M = 2.54) than in the dolphin (M = .41) 
condition. There were no significant differences in the gorilla condition (M = .10). 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
           The dolphin carton was significantly different on perceptions of anthropomorphism, 
which is the primary focus of this study. Additionally, the dolphin cartoon was closest in 
perceptions of realism with the human cartoon avatar. The avatars needed to vary on perceptions 
of anthropomorphism, but both needed to be similar in perceptions of realism.  
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Measures 
The measures used in this research underwent a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to 
determine the validity of the measure. The CFA included the items recommended by the 
literature for each scale. The CFA also included measures for internal and external consistency. 
Three criteria tested item quality (Nowak, Hamilton & Hammond, 2009). The first criterion, 
which concerned the content validity of the items, was homogeneity of item content (face 
validity), and Items had to tap into the same underlying theme. The coefficient alpha and the 
homogeneity of the items support the internal consistency of the measure (Williams & Monge, 
2001). The second criterion was internal consistency, measured with coefficient alpha 
(unidimensionality), which examines whether the matrix of correlations among the items on the 
scale is relatively flat. The inter-item correlation for each of the following scales, and the items, 
is at .44 or higher. The third criterion was parallelism, also known as external consistency, which 
examines the extent to which each item on a scale correlates with other scales in the study to 
approximately the same degree (in the case of similar item quality) or forms a gradient. High 
inter-item correlation and parallelism determine the external consistency of the scales used 
(Williams & Monge, 2001). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient 
  The AQ is a self-reported measure used to determine the extent to which an individual 
identifies with traits related to this disorder (Baron-Cohen, Hoekstra, Knickmeyer, & 
Wheelwright, 2006). The AQ consists of 50 items measured on a seven-point metric (1 = 
strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) capturing five areas related to AQ: communication, 
social skills, imagination, attention to detail, and attention switching and has been summed 
together to form one scale in previous research (Baron-Cohen, et al 2006). Previous research 
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treated the AQ as a cumulative score; however, recent research (Stevenson & Hart, 2017) 
examined the use of this scale as a Likert measure and validated its use as a continuous variable 
within a neurotypical population. The AQ in this study served as a means of examining 
individual-level differences on the sub-dimensions of the AQ, and their relationship with 
outcome variables. The CFA results confirmed four dimensions of the scale identified through 
face validity, though only three dimensions (social skills, attention switching, mentalizing) 
retained sufficient items to allow the creation of a useable scale. These scales do not share a 
unidimensional factor structure. Therefore, the three dimensions (social skills, attention 
switching, and mentalizing) were treated as separate constructs. 
The factors were tested based on the three-factor solution tested and applied in previous 
research (Palmer et al., 2014; Rourke & McGloin, 2019). The final scales for the AQ (See Table 
3) retained twenty of the original items that comprise the separate subscales identified as Social 
Skills (items: 15, 17, 22, 26, 38, 44, & 47), Attention Switching (items: 10, 25, 32, 34, & 37), 
and Mentalizing (items: 3, 8, 14, 27, 31, 36, 40, & 50). The scales met the criterion to determine 
parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for social skills (r = .43) attention switching 
(r = .45) and mentalizing (r = .47) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also 
showed good internal consistency in this study: (social skills: α = .83; attention switching: α = 
.73; mentalizing: α = .78). 
The participants who reported having a diagnosis of ASD were significantly different on 
the AQ scales from those who did not have ASD (See Table 5). An analysis of variance indicates 
that participants without ASD scored significantly higher on social skills attention switching 
(M = 3.87, SD\ and mentalizing  
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
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Anthropomorphism 
Anthropomorphism included five items (See Table 4), measured using seven points from 
not at all to very much (Nowak et al., 2009). The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and 
the dolphin cartoon avatar retained all five items. The scales met the criterion to determine 
parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for dolphin cartoon anthropomorphism (r = 
.67) and the human cartoon anthropomorphism (r = .60) met the criterion for external 
consistency. The scales also showed good internal consistency in this study: (dolphin 
cartoon: α = .88; human cartoon: α = .87).  
Homophily 
McCroskey, Richmond, and Daly’s (1975) measure (See Table 4) captures a participant’s 
perception of perceived homophily. The operational definition of the construct includes measures 
of attitude and background as well as status (McCroskey et al., 1975). The scale includes seven 
items, measured using seven points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scale includes 
items such as ¨This person/avatar thinks like me¨, and ¨This person/avatar is like me¨.  
           The final scale retained five items. The scale met the criterion to determine parallelism. 
However, two items had low internal consistency, and they were not included. The items 
removed were 1. My instructor thinks like me, 6. My instructor’s status is like mine. The scales 
met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors for the 
remaining dolphin cartoon homophily items (r = .44) and the human cartoon homophily items 
(r = .60) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good internal 
consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .67; human cartoon: α = .80). 
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Copresence 
Nowak & Biocca’s (2003) measure captured the participant’s perceptions of copresence 
using two scales (See Table 4), of perceived other-copresence, and self-reported copresence.   
           Perceived other-copresence. The scale includes eleven items, measured using seven 
points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scales include items such as, “My 
interaction partner was intensely involved in our interaction,” “My interaction partner seemed to 
find our interaction stimulating,” and “My interaction partner communicated coldness rather than 
warmth.” Based on the inter-item correlations, the final scales for the human cartoon avatar and 
the dolphin cartoon avatar retained six of the original items. The items removed were, 3. My 
instructor communicated coldness rather than warmth. 4. My instructor created a sense of 
distance between us. 5. My instructor seemed detached during our interaction. 6. My instructor 
was unwilling to share personal information with me. 9. My instructor acted bored by our 
conversation. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within 
factors for the remaining dolphin cartoon other-copresence scale (r = .59) and human cartoon 
other-copresence scale (r = .67) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also 
showed good internal consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .87; human cartoon: α = 
.87). 
           Self-reported copresence. The scale includes five items, measured using seven points 
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The scales include items such as, “The avatar was 
intensely involved in our interaction” and “The avatar created a sense of closeness between us.” 
The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and the dolphin cartoon avatar retained all five 
items. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation within factors 
for dolphin cartoon self-reported copresence (r = .53) and the human cartoon self-reported 
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copresence (r = .75) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good 
internal consistency in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .84; human cartoon: α = .91). 
Perceived instructor satisfaction 
  The measure is a modified scale (See Table 4) from Nowak, Watt, & Walther (2009). The 
scale includes eight items, measured using seven points from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
The scales include items such as, “To what extent did you feel you got a good enough idea of 
how your instructor was reacting?”, “Do you think you got a ‘‘feel” for your instructor at the 
other end?” The final scales for the human cartoon avatar and the dolphin cartoon avatar retained 
all eight items. The scales met the criterion to determine parallelism. The lowest correlation 
within factors for dolphin anthropomorphism (r = .57) and for the human anthropomorphism (r = 
.47) met the criterion for external consistency. The scales also showed good internal consistency 
in this study: (dolphin cartoon: α = .87; human cartoon: α = .89). 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
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CHAPTER IV: RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 4 presents all of the factor loadings, means, and standard deviations for the scales 
used. ,  
Manipulation Check  
 
   First, a factorial ANOVA compared perceptions of anthropomorphism in the human 
avatar condition to those in the dolphin avatar condition, ASD diagnosis, and no diagnosis, and 
the interaction effect. Table 8a shows that there is a significant effect for ASD diagnosis F(1, 
391) = 58.46, p = .000, on perceptions of anthropomorphism. Condition is also a significant 
predictor F1, 391) = 28.00, p = .000, of anthropomorphism (see Table 8b). However, there is no 
significant interaction between condition and ASD diagnosis on perceptions of 
anthropomorphism. This study is largely concerned with perceptions of anthropomorphism and 
not the effect of condition. 
  Additionally, while having a diagnosis of autism may affect these perceptions, most of 
the hypotheses in this study look at the sub-dimension of the AQ. However, it is essential to look 
at the diagnosis in totality first and then examine the unique contribution of each sub-scale. 
Previous research indicates that the subscales do not always correlate with one another and 
therefore are not a unidimensional construct (Palmer et al., 2014; Rourke & McGloin, 2019). 
Furthermore, each scale provides a unique explanatory power that would be lost by examining a 
binary measure of diagnosis.  
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Hypothesis Testing 
           The hypotheses in this study were all tested using hierarchal regression analysis. The 
categorical variables in the study were effect coded. The avatars were coded (human=2, and 
dolphin=1) (see Table 7), and the participants were coded based on diagnosis (ASD=-1, no 
ASD=1) (see Table 8). Hierarchical regression is the best method to see the effect of the 
individual AQ measures and perceived anthropomorphism, beyond the effects of condition and 
diagnosis. The condition and diagnosis are multiplied together to create an interaction term. The 
second step of the regression model included the interaction term to examine the effect of the 
interaction on perceptions of anthropomorphism and the (see Table 9). All of the regression 
analyses included two steps. The first step included the direct effect of ASD diagnosis and the 
direct effect on the independent variables proposed by each hypothesis. The second step included 
the proposed interaction term for the hypothesis. The interactions for each hypothesis were 
computed by first centering the variables using the appropriate z-score, and then the z-scores 
were multiplied to compute the interaction.   
Based on the social motivation theory of autism, research question one proposed that an 
individual’s social skills might influence how anthropomorphic they perceive the avatars. This 
model was significant, but in the opposite direction than the theory predicts. The condition did 
have a significant effect on perceptions of anthropomorphism F(1, 393) =22.87, p < .001, and the 
human cartoon avatar significantly and positively predicted perceptions of anthropomorphism 
(β = .24, p < .001). Additionally, a participants social skills also significantly affected 
perceptions of anthropomorphism F(2, 392) = 21.89, p < .001. Social skills positively predicted 
(β = .21, p < .001) an additional 5 percent of the variance explained (R2 = .10, ∆R2 = .05) in 
perceptions of anthropomorphism.  
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Based on the social motivation theory of autism research, question two proposed that an 
individual’s mentalizing abilities might also influence how anthropomorphic they perceive the 
avatars. However, this model was not significant. Condition was significant F(1, 391) 
=22.33, p < .001; and it was found that the human cartoon avatar positively predicted perceptions 
of anthropomorphism (β = .23, p < .001). However, mentalizing did not affect perceptions of 
anthropomorphism. 
           Hypothesis 1 predicted that typically developed individuals would experience more 
homophily when they perceive anthropomorphism to be higher. Therefore, there will be a direct 
effect of anthropomorphism on homophily and the interaction between ASD diagnosis and 
anthropomorphism. The first model contained the direct effect for anthropomorphism and ASD 
diagnosis on homophily, and the model was significant F(2, 387) = 5.28, p < .01, and predicted 3 
percent (R2 = .03) of the variance explained in perceptions of homophily. Anthropomorphism 
was the only significant predictor (β = .17, p = .001 of homophily). The second model included 
the interaction effect of ASD diagnosis and perceived anthropomorphism on homophily 
proposed by hypothesis 1. This model was also significant F(3, 386) = 7.34, p =.000 and the 
interaction predicts an additional 2 percent (R2 = .05, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions 
of homophily. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β = .16, p < .01), and the 
interaction between ASD diagnosis and anthropomorphism (β = .17, p = .001) homophily. The 
regression model provides support for hypothesis 1. Thus, a follow-up test will clarify the 
moderation effect of ASD.  
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and perceptions 
of homophily as moderated by ASD – categorized as low (-1 no ASD) and high (+1 ASD). As 
demonstrated in Figure 1, the simple slope was statistically significant at a high level (β = 
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.05, p = .000). Therefore, those with ASD expressed more homophily with the more 
anthropomorphic avatar than those without ASD. 
 Hypothesis 2a predicted that social skills would moderate the relationship between 
anthropomorphism and homophily. Therefore, there should be a direct effect of 
anthropomorphism on homophily and the interaction between social skills and 
anthropomorphism. The first model contained the direct effect for ASD diagnosis and 
anthropomorphism on homophily, and the model was significant F(3, 386) = 3.85, p = .01. The 
model predicted 3 percent (R2 = .03) of the variance explained in perceptions of homophily. The 
significant predictor of homophily was anthropomorphism (β = .17, p < .01). The second model 
included the interaction between social skills and anthropomorphism, the model was 
significant F(4, 385) = 5.11, p = .001; the interaction predicted an additional 2 percent (R2 = 
.05, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions of homophily. The significant predictors are, 
anthropomorphism (β = .17, p < .01) and the interaction between social skills and 
anthropomorphism (β = .15, p < .01). 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism on perceptions 
of homophily as moderated by social skills – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), 
medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 2, the simple 
slope was statistically significant at the medium (β = .09, p = .00) and high level (β = .22, p = 
.000). Therefore, those with ASD expressed more homophily with the more anthropomorphic 
avatar than those without ASD. This effect is in the opposite direction.  
Hypothesis 2b predicted an interaction effect for mentalizing and anthropomorphism on 
homophily. Thus, those that struggle more with mentalizing will feel less homophily with the 
more anthropomorphic avatar than they will with the less anthropomorphic avatar. The first 
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model included anthropomorphism, mentalizing, and ASD diagnosis. The model was 
significant F(3, 384) = 6.24, p < .001 and predicted 5 percent (R2 = .05) of the variance 
explained in perceptions of homophily. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β = 
.13, p < .05) and mentalizing (β = -.17, p < .01). The second model included the interaction 
between mentalizing and anthropomorphism, and the model was significant F(4, 383) = 6.92, p < 
.01. The interaction between mentalizing and anthropomorphism predicted an additional 2 
percent (R2 = .07, ∆R2 = .02) of the variance in perceptions of homophily. The significant 
predictors are anthropomorphism (β = .154, p <.01 .05), mentalizing (β = -.14, p < .05) and the 
interaction (β = .15, p < .01).The regression model provides support for hypothesis 2b.  
           A follow-up test will clarify (see Figure 3) the moderation effect of mentalizing at 
different levels – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium (mean), and high 
(+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 2, the simple slope was statistically 
significant at medium (β = .11, p =.001) and high levels (β = .22, p < .01). The figure and results 
indicate those that struggle more with mentalizing experienced more homophily with the more 
anthropomorphic avatar than the less anthropomorphic avatar. The results are significant but in 
the opposite direction predicted. 
           Hypothesis 3 hypothesized that typically developed individuals would experience more 
other-copresence when they perceive anthropomorphism to be higher. Thus, there will be a direct 
effect of anthropomorphism on other-copresence and the interaction between diagnosis and 
anthropomorphism. The first model included the direct effect for homophily, ASD diagnosis, and 
anthropomorphism on perceptions of other-copresence. The first model was significant F(3, 384) 
= 6.34, p = .000; and predicted 5 percent of the variance (R2 = .05) in perceptions of other 
copresence. The significant predictors in the first model are anthropomorphism (β = .18, p = 
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.001) and homophily (β = .11, p < .05). The second model included the interaction for ASD 
diagnosis and anthropomorphism; the model was significant F(4, 383) = 14.04, p = .000, and 
predicted an additional 5 percent of the variance in perceptions of other copresence (R2 = 
.10, ∆R2 = .05). The significant predictors in the second model are anthropomorphism (β = 
.18, p = .001), and the interaction (β =.24, p = .000). 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and perceptions 
of other-copresence as moderated by ASD – categorized as low (-1 no ASD), and high (+1 
ASD). The results (see Figure 4) indicate that those with autism experience greater other-
copresence with the more anthropomorphic avatar than those with a diagnosis. The effect is 
significant, but the effect is in the opposite direction.  
Hypothesis 4a predicted that there would be an interaction between attention switching 
and anthropomorphism. Thus, those that struggle more with attention switching will experience 
less other-copresence with the more anthropomorphic avatar. The first model included ASD 
diagnosis, homophily, anthropomorphism and attention switching. The model was 
significant F(4, 383) = 9.12, p = .000, and predicted 9 percent (R2 = .09) of the variance in 
perceptions of other copresence. The significant predictors in the second model are 
anthropomorphism (β = .16, p < .01) and attention switching (β = -.22, p =.000). The second 
model included the interaction effect and the model was significant F(5, 382) = 8.22, p < .05. 
The interaction accounts for an additional 1 percent (R2 = .10, ∆R2 = .01) of the variance 
explained in perceptions other-copresence. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism (β = 
.15, p < .01), homophily (β = .10, p < .05), attention switching (β = -.23, p =.000), and the 
interaction (β = -.10, p < .05). 
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A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and other-
copresence as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium 
(mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 5, the simple slope was 
statistically significant at low (β = .19, p = .000) and medium levels (β = .12, p < .01). The figure 
indicates that those that struggle more with mentalizing will experience less other-copresence 
when anthropomorphism is high.  
Hypothesis 4b predicted that social skills would moderate the effect of 
anthropomorphism on other-copresence. The first model included ASD diagnosis, homophily, 
anthropomorphism, and social skills. The model was significant F(4, 383) = 7.16, p = .000; and 
predicted 6 percent (R2 = .06) of the variance in perceptions of other-copresence. 
Anthropomorphism (β = .19, p = .000), homophily (β = .11, p <.05), and social skills (β = -
.17, p < .01) were significant positive predictors of other-copresence. The interaction effect of 
social skills and anthropomorphism proposed by 4b was not significant. 
Hypothesis 4c predicted that mentalizing would moderate the relationship between 
anthropomorphism and other-copresence, such that those that are lower in mentalizing will 
experience less other-copresence than those higher in mentalizing. The first model contained 
ASD diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily and mentalizing and the model was 
significant F(4, 381) = 7.30, p =.000. The model predicts 6 percent (R2 = .06) of the variance 
explained in perceptions of other-copresence. Anthropomorphism (β = .15, p = .01) and 
mentalizing (β = -.19, p < .01) are significant predictors of other-reported copresence. The 
second model included the interaction effect for mentalizing and anthropomorphism on other-
copresence; the model is significant F(5, 380) = 7.15, p =.000 and predicts an additional 1 
percent (R2 = .07, ∆R2 = .01) of the variance explained in perceptions of other-copresence. The 
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significant predictors in the final model are anthropomorphism (β = .13, p < .05), mentalizing 
(β = -.22, p =.000), and the interaction (β = -.13, p =.05). 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between anthropomorphism and other-
copresence as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), medium 
(mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 6, the simple slope was 
statistically significant at low (β = .22, p = .000) and medium levels (β = .14, p = .000). The 
figure indicates that those that struggle more with mentalizing will experience less other-
copresence when anthropomorphism is high.  
           Hypothesis 5 tests the direct effect for other-copresence, on self-copresence. The first 
model included the direct effect for other-copresence, homophily, ASD diagnosis and 
anthropomorphism on perceptions of self-copresence; model is significant F(4, 381) = 25.24, p = 
.000 and accounts for 21 percent (R2 = .16) of the variance explained in perceptions of self-
copresence. The model included significant direct effects for ASD diagnosis (β = .10, p <.05) 
anthropomorphism (β = .40, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = -.20, p = .000). The final model 
included the interaction and the model was not significant.  
Hypothesis 6a tested the interaction between attention switching and other-copresence on 
self-copresence. Hypothesis 6a predicts that those who struggle more with attention switching 
will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model included the 
main effect for ASD diagnosis homophily, attention switching, anthropomorphism, and other-
copresence. The model was significant F(5, 380) = 28.16, p = .000 and accounts for 21 percent 
(R2 = .21) of the variance explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant predictors 
in the model are ASD diagnosis (β = .12, p <.05), anthropomorphism (β = .40, p = .000) and 
other-copresence (β = -.20, p =.000). The second block included the interaction effect with 
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attention switching and other-copresence. The model was significant F(6, 379) = 26.448, p = 
.000, and predicts an additional 3 percent (R2 = .24, ∆R2 = .03) of the variance explained in self-
copresence. The significant predictors in the second model are anthropomorphism (β = .40, p = 
.000), other-copresence (β = -.22, p = .000), and the interaction was a significant predictor (β = -
.17, p = .000). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 6a. Thus, a follow up test 
will clarify the moderation effect of attention switching at different levels. 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between other-copresence on perceptions of 
self copresence as moderated by attention switching – categorized as low (-1 SD below the 
mean), medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 6, the 
simple slope was statistically significant at medium (β = -.12, p < .05) and high levels (β = -
.33, p = .000). The figure and results indicate those that struggle more with attention switching 
skills experienced less self copresence when other-copresence was high than those that struggle 
less with attention switching. 
Hypothesis 6b tested the interaction between social skills and other-copresence on 
perceptions of self-copresence. Hypothesis 6b predicts that those who score higher on social 
skills will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model was 
significant F(5, 380) = 39.13, p = .000 and predicts 21 percent (R2 = .21) of the variance 
explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant predictors are anthropomorphism 
(β = .40, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = -.19, p= .000). The second model included the 
interaction, and there were no significant interaction effects for social skills and other-copresence 
on self-copresence. 
Hypothesis 6c tested the interaction between metalizing and other-copresence on 
perceptions of self-copresence. Hypothesis 6c predicts that those who score higher on 
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mentalizing will experience less self-copresence when other-copresence is high. The first model 
included the direct effects for anthropomorphism, homophily, ASD diagnosis, other-copresence, 
and mentalizing. The model was significant F(5, 378) = 20.71, p = .000 and accounts for 21 
percent (R2 = .21) of the variance explained in perceptions of self-copresence. The significant 
predictors are ASD diagnosis (β = -.35, p < .05), anthropomorphism (β = .41, p = .000), and 
other-copresence (β = -.20, p = -000). The second model included the interaction effect between 
mentalizing and other-copresence and was not significant. 
  Hypothesis 7 tested the direct effect of ASD diagnosis, self-copresence, and the 
interaction on instructor satisfaction. The first [block included the main effects of ASD 
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, and self-copresence. The model was significant F(4, 
378) = 14.79, p = .000 and predicts 14 percent (R2 =.14) of the variance in perceptions of 
instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors of instructor satisfaction are homophily (β = 
.15, p <.01) and self-copresence (β = -.36, p = .000). The interaction in the second model was not 
significant.  
Hypothesis 8a tested the interaction between attention switching and perceptions of self-
copresence on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effect for ASD 
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, attention switching and self-copresence; the model 
was significant F(5, 377) =19.89, p = .000 and predicts 15 percent (R2 = .15) of the variance in 
perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors of instructor satisfaction are, 
homophily (β = .13, p < .01), attention switching (β = -.16, p <.01), and self-copresence (β = -
.36, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between attention switching and self-
copresence on instructor satisfaction; the model was significant F(6, 376) = 19.61, p = .000 and 
predicts an additional 3 percent (R2 = .17, ∆R2 = .03) of the variance explained in instructor 
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satisfaction. The predictors are; homophily (β = .14, p < .01), self-copresence (β = -.37, p = 
.000), attention switching (β = -.16, p < .01), and the interaction between attention switching and 
self-copresence (β = -.17, p =.000). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 8a. 
Thus, a follow up test will clarify the moderation effect of mentalizing at different levels. 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between self-copresence on perceptions of 
instructor satisfaction as moderated by attention switching – categorized as low (-1 SD below the 
mean), medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 8, the 
simple slope was statistically significant at the low (β = -.16, p = .00), medium (β = -.30, p = 
.000), and high levels (β = -.46, p = .000). The figure and results indicate those that struggle 
more with attention experienced greater instructor satisfaction when self copresence was low 
than those that struggle less with attention switching.  
Hypothesis 8b tested the interaction between social skills on perceptions of self-
copresence on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD 
diagnosis, anthropomorphism, homophily, social skills and self-copresence on instructor 
satisfaction; the model was significant F(5, 377) = 16.15, p = .000 and predicted 18 percent (R2 
= .18) of the variance in perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors in the 
model were homophily (β = .16, p = .001), social skills (β = -.23, p = .000), self-copresence (β = 
-.34, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between social skills and self-
copresence and was not significant.  
Hypothesis 8c tested the interaction between mentalizing and self-copresence on 
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, 
anthropomorphism, mentalizing and self-copresence on instructor satisfaction; the model was 
significant F(5, 375) = 11.82, p = .000 and predicts 13 percent (R2 = .13) of the variance. The 
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significant predictors are homophily (β = .13, p = .01), mentalizing (β = -.11, p < .05), and self-
copresence (β = -.35, p = .000). The second model included the interaction between mentalizing 
and self-copresence and the model was significant F(6, 374) = 11.61, p < .01 and predicts an 
additional 2percent (R2 = .16, ∆R2 = .02). The significant predictors are homophily (β = .14, p = 
.01), mentalizing (β = -.12, p < .05), self-copresence (β = -.37, p = .000), and the interaction (β = 
-.15, p < .01). The regression model provides support for hypothesis 8c. Thus, a follow up test 
will clarify the moderation effect of mentalizing at different levels. 
A follow-up test will clarify the relationship between self copresence on perceptions of 
instructor satisfaction as moderated by mentalizing – categorized as low (-1 SD below the mean), 
medium (mean), and high (+1 SD above the mean). As demonstrated in Figure 9, the simple 
slope was statistically significant at the low (β = -.19, p = .000), medium (β = -.31, p = .000), and 
high levels (β = -.43, p = .000). The figure and results indicate that those who struggle more with 
mentalizing experienced greater instructor satisfaction when self-copresence was low than those 
that struggle less with mentalizing.  
Hypothesis 9 tested the main effect of ASD diagnosis, other-copresence and the 
interaction on instructor satisfaction. The model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, 
anthropomorphism, homophily, self-copresence, and other-copresence; the model was 
significant F(5, 375) = 49.15, p = .000 and predicts 39 percent (R2 = .39) of the variance in 
instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors are homophily (β = .10, p < .05), self-
copresence (β = -.24, p = .000) and other-copresence (β = .53, p = .000). The second model 
included the interaction and the model was not significant.  
Hypothesis 10a tested the interaction between attention switching and other-copresence 
on instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, 
43 
 
homophily, anthropomorphism, self-copresence, other-copresence, and attention switching; the 
model is significant F(6, 374) = 41.13, p = .000 and predicts an additional 39 percent (R2 = .39) 
of the variance perceptions of instructor satisfaction. Self-copresence (β = -.24, p = .000) and 
other-copresence (β = .52, p = .000) are the significant predictors of instructor satisfaction. The 
final model included the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence, and the model 
was not significant.  
Hypothesis 10b tested the interaction between social skills and other-copresence on 
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, homophily, 
anthropomorphism, self-copresence, other-copresence and attention switching; the model was 
significant F(6, 374) = 43.60, p = .000] and predicts 12 percent (R2 = .40) of the variance in 
perceptions of instructor satisfaction. The significant predictors were homophily (β = -.10, p = 
.01), self-copresence (β = -.23, p = .000), other-copresence (β = .51, p = .000) and social skills 
(β = -.14, p <.01). The second model included the interaction between attention switching and 
other-copresence, and the model was not significant.  
Hypothesis 10c tested the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence on 
instructor satisfaction. The first model included the direct effects for ASD diagnosis, homophily, 
anthropomorphism, self-copresence, mentalizing, and other-copresence. The first model was 
significant F(6, 372) = 39.40, p = .000 and predicts 38 percent (R2 = .38) of the variance in 
instructor satisfaction. Homophily (β = .09, p < .05), self-copresence (β = -.23, p = .000), and 
other-copresence (β = .53, p = .000) are the significant predictors of instructor satisfaction. The 
final model included the interaction between mentalizing and other-copresence, and the model 
was not significant.  
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Summary of Hypotheses  
RQ1: No  Social skills will moderate perceptions of anthropomorphism. 
RQ2: Yes Mentalizing will moderate perceptions of anthropomorphism 
H1: Yes  Anthropomorphism will positively predict perceptions of homophily. ASD diagnosis 
will moderate the effect of anthropomorphism on homophily, such that those with an 
ASD diagnosis will perceive less homophily than those without a diagnosis.  
H2a: No  Participants that score higher on social skills will report less homophily when 
perceived anthropomorphism is higher than those that score lower on social skills. 
H2b: Yes  Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less homophily when 
perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
H3:  Yes  Anthropomorphism will positively predict other-copresence. ASD diagnosis will 
moderate this effect, such that those with an ASD diagnosis will perceive less other-
copresence when anthropomorphism is high than those without a diagnosis.  
H4a:  Yes Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less other-copresence 
when perceived anthropomorphism is higher, than those that that score lower on 
attention switching.   
H4b:  Yes  Participants that score higher on social skills will report less other-copresence when 
perceived anthropomorphism higher, than those that score lower on social skills. 
H4c: Yes  Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less other-copresence when 
anthropomorphism is high than those that score lower on mentalizing.   
H5:  Yes  Other-copresence will positively predict self-copresence. ASD diagnosis will 
moderate the effect of other-copresence on self-copresence, such that those with an 
ASD diagnosis will perceive less self-copresence when other-copresence is high than 
those without a diagnosis. 
H6a:  Yes  Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less self-copresence 
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention switching. 
H6b:  No  Participants that score higher on social skills will report less self-copresence when 
other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills. 
H6c:  No  Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less self-copresence when 
other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
H7:  Yes  Self-copresence will positively predict instructor satisfaction. ASD diagnosis will 
moderate the effect of self-copresence on instructor satisfaction, such that those with 
an ASD diagnosis will perceive less instructor satisfaction when self-copresence is 
high than those without a diagnosis.  
H8a:  Yes  Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor 
satisfaction when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention 
switching. 
H8b:  No  Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction 
when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills. 
H8c:  No Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction 
when self-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
H9:  No  Other-copresence will positively predict instructor effectiveness. ASD diagnosis will 
moderate the effect of other-copresence on instructor satisfaction, such that those with 
an ASD diagnosis will perceive less instructor satisfaction when other-copresence is 
high than those without a diagnosis. 
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H10a:  No  Participants that score higher on attention switching will report less instructor 
satisfaction when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on attention 
switching. 
H10b:  No  Participants that score higher on social skills will report less instructor satisfaction 
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on social skills. 
H10c:  No  Participants that score higher on mentalizing will report less instructor satisfaction 
when other-copresence is higher, than those that score lower on mentalizing. 
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CHAPTER V: DISCUSSION 
Summary of Findings 
           This study is one of the first to examine the effect of perceptions and self and other-
copresence with ASD participants. Based on the theory of executive dysfunction, when a person 
struggles with mentalizing, social skills, and attention switching, they will process information 
differently than their typically developed peers. The existing literature in education emphasizes 
the importance of presence as a significant predictor of learning satisfaction online. The results 
from this study indicate that presence is an important construct, but self-copresence and other-
copresence are discreet constructs and should be separate measures. Furthermore, the individual 
measures of the AQ confirm that individual characteristics also play an essential role in the 
perception process.  
           Information processing theory and the theory of executive dysfunction taken together 
support the assumptions proposed by this study. Individuals have a limited capacity to process 
information, and for those that experience specific issues related to executive function, they 
process information differently than their typically developed peers. The literature on the impact 
of presence is education emphasizes the importance of presence in distance learning. The studies 
in this specific area emphasize the importance of presence as a significant predictor of student 
satisfaction and motivation (Booker & Rebman, 2005; Kuo, Walker, Belland, & Schroder, 2013; 
Pike, 1993; Roberts & Styron, 2010; Schreiner & Nelson, 2013), as well as instructor satisfaction 
(Lyons, Reysen, & Pierce, 2012; Wei & Chen, 2012; Weinel, Bannert, Zumbach, Hoppe, & 
Malzahn, 2011). However, as the results from this study indicate that presence is not a singular 
construct, and all participants to not respond to increased presence in the same way. Participants 
in the study that scored higher on the measures of the AQ specifically related to attention 
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switching and mentalizing experience digital environments differently than their typically 
developed peers. The results from this study also show that these unique individual differences 
can lead to less satisfaction with the instructor when the user experiences increased presence in 
the interaction. Additionally, the results from this study show that those on the spectrum process 
anthropomorphism and perceptions of copresence differently than their TD peers.  
           The first question posed by this study specifically examined perceptions of humanness or 
anthropomorphism for those with ASD. The research examining how those with ASD respond to 
less humanlike characters has not explicitly examined anthropomorphism as a variable. The 
results from this study first show that those with ASD do not perceive anthropomorphism or self-
copresence in the same way that their typically developed peers do. The social motivation theory 
of autism explains that those with ASD may not prefer engaging with persons or, in the case of 
this study, digital entities that they perceive to have greater social potential. Individuals with 
ASD may find greater social potential less rewarding because they do not seek social rewards, 
and they find those interactions less rewarding. The social entities may be less rewarding 
because of problems with specific social skills, but also to deficits related to executive functions. 
The results from this study show that when participants with ASD interacted with an avatar that 
they rated as more anthropomorphic, they experienced increased homophily with the avatar. The 
results also indicate that individual differences in social skills and mentalizing predicted a 
stronger feeling of homophily with the more anthropomorphic avatar.  
The findings are not in the predicted direction, but they make sense theoretically. The 
human avatar is perceived, as "more human" than the dolphin, but the human avatar is, in fact, 
still a digital representation of a human. The CASA paradigm has established that individuals 
will apply social rules when interacting with computers (Reeves & Nass, 1996). The more that 
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computers or digital entities exhibit greater social potential, the more likely they are to be rated 
as anthropomorphic. Previous research examining avatars with typically developed participants 
found a positive correlation between perceptions of anthropomorphism and homophily. The 
results from this study support those findings for those that scored higher on the AQ scales 
related to social skills and mentalizing.  
Based on the theory of executive dysfunction, those with ASD tend to struggle with self-
perception, planning, and judgment. Therefore, these specific executive dysfunctions might 
affect perceptions of homophily or similarity with an avatar perceived as having greater social 
potential. The results from the moderation analysis indicate that when individuals struggled more 
with social skills and mentalizing, they experienced more homophily with the more 
anthropomorphic avatar. Previous research indicates that those with ASD prefer robots and less 
humanlike characters, but these studies did not measure a participant's perceptions of 
anthropomorphism. The findings from this study indicate that homophily was higher with the 
more humanlike avatars, even for participants that are on the autism spectrum. The results 
signify that while individuals with ASD may prefer robots and less humanlike characters, they 
feel similar to humanlike representations. The human avatar is, in fact, more similar to the 
participants in the study than a dolphin, and thus, the effect for anthropomorphism is unaffected 
by a participant's social skills or mentalizing ability. The avatars used in this study were 
dynamic, but they cannot display emotion or to show a wide range of facial expressions. This 
may account for the lack of variance in homophily for those with ASD. A more "humanlike" 
avatar that can emote more may produce different results.   
This study also supports the assertion that those with ASD may not benefit from 
increased social potential, specifically increased perceptions of self-copresence. The more 
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anthropomorphic avatar in this study did increase perceptions of self-copresence as predicted. 
Additionally, there is a positive direct effect for other-copresence on self-copresence. However, 
those that expressed trouble with attention switching and mentalizing did not feel more self-
copresence when other-copresence was high. Finally, the results show that when other-
copresence is high, participants felt less self-copresence, and lower self-copresence serves as a 
positive predictor of instructor satisfaction. The results indicate that those that expressed more 
difficulty with mentalizing and attention switching prefer to feel less self-copresence in the 
online environment.  
Anthropomorphism positively correlates with greater perceptions of self and other 
copresence. Furthermore, when other-copresence is higher, participants also feel more self-
copresence. However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction, those that struggle more 
with attention switching, social skills, and mentalizing will experience less self-copresence when 
other-copresence is higher. The theory of executive dysfunction identifies that when individuals 
have trouble with mental flexibility, they are not able to move fluidly from one task to another. 
As a result, participants must attend to the avatar in tandem with the content of the message. 
Therefore, they must attempt to understand the other and the message simultaneously.  
           Participants in this study listened to a message about the environmental protection act. 
However, the avatar in this study represents the second stream of content that participants must 
process. The avatar also represents a stream of information that contains a varying degree of 
social potential. A participant's ability to mentalize, or understand others can make it difficult to 
focus on the message and affect their ability to feel present in the learning environment. There 
were no significant moderation effects for social skills; however, attention switching and 
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mentalizing produced significant moderation effects between other-copresence and perceptions 
of self-copresence.  
           Typically, when other-copresence is high, participants also feel they are more copresent 
(self-copresent). However, based on the theory of executive dysfunction, individuals with ASD 
may process information differently than their typically developed peers. The results from this 
study provide support for the assertions that increased other-copresence did not increase self-
copresence for those with ASD. The hierarchal regression analysis conducted included the main 
effect of anthropomorphism on perceptions of self-copresence. The literature indicates that when 
anthropomorphism is high, self-copresence will increase. However, the results from this study 
show that when a person struggles more with their ability to take the perspectives of others 
(mentalize), increased other-copresence negatively affects self-copresence. Thus, when 
participants expressed more difficulty mentalizing, they experienced less self-copresence when 
other-copresence was high. Figure 7 illustrates that when participants struggle more with 
mentalizing and they are with an avatar, they have rated higher in other-copresence; they feel 
less self-copresence—these effects held at both low med and high levels of mentalizing. 
Therefore, increased other-copresence and anthropomorphism can be beneficial on their 
own to increase a student's sense of being present. However, an individual's ability to imagine 
the perspectives of others will significantly affect their sense of self-copresence. The results 
indicate that a participant's perception of anthropomorphism positively affects their self-
copresence. However, when participants struggle more with mentalizing increased other-
copresence will negatively affect self-copresence. The negative effect of self-copresence did not 
negatively predict instructor satisfaction. The participants that struggle with mentalizing 
expressed greater instructor satisfaction when they felt less presence in the interaction and, this 
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follows with the theory of executive dysfunction and the difficulties that those with ASD 
experience when processing multiple streams of information. Thus, when self-copresence in 
lower and the participants do not feel that they need to process themselves in the interaction, they 
likely feel they can concentrate more on the instructor and the content.  
           The participants that expressed difficulty with attention switching also felt less self-
copresence when other-copresence was high. The competing streams of information that are 
present when presented with a dynamic avatar and a message pose a potential problem for those 
that struggle with staying on task and regulating the flow of information. Therefore, when other-
copresence is high, participants are processing entities that also have more potential that is social. 
The more anthropomorphic avatar is higher in social potential and, in turn, increased perceptions 
of other-copresence. However, this is not true for those that struggle with attention switching. 
Figure four shows that those both high and low on attention switching will perceive less self-
copresence when other-copresence is high. Thus, the more anthropomorphic avatar is less critical 
for those with ASD.  
           Participants that express difficulty with mentalizing and attention switching may find a 
source that is higher in copresence to be distracting, and this affects their ability to feel more 
self-copresence. The current literature in education emphasizes the importance of greater 
instructor presence. However, the results of this study indicate that this may not be important for 
all types of students. Information processing theories posit that individuals have a limited 
capacity to process stimuli, and allocating resources properly aids in processing information. 
These findings show that those with ASD are less involved when an instructor is more salient. 
Thus, processing an avatar perceived as more copresent, and the content aimed at understanding, 
can be more challenging for persons with ASD. Participants did express greater instructor 
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effectiveness when self-copresence was high. However, as postulated, this was not the case for 
those with ASD. The participants that struggle more with mentalizing and attention switching 
expressed greater instructor effectiveness when self-copresence was low.  
           Information processing theory states that all individuals have a limited capacity to attend 
to information. Taken together with the theory of executive dysfunction, individuals that struggle 
with attention switching, or moving fluidly from one task to another, will experience greater 
difficulty than their more typically developed peers will. The results from Figure 5 support these 
theoretical models and the proposed hypothesis. The participants that expressed more trouble 
with attention switching in the low, medium, and high conditions expressed lower instructor 
satisfaction when self-copresence was high.  
           Based on the study findings, all that can be determined is that those participants that 
express social skills deficits rate the instructor regardless of condition or perceptions of 
anthropomorphism, as less satisfactory. One of the core areas that define autistic disorders is a 
deficit in social skills. Therefore, future research will need to disentangle which type of virtual 
instructor would work best for those that struggle with social skills. The conclusion delves into a 
more in-depth discussion of this finding. 
           Avatars that are more anthropomorphic are important to instructor satisfaction. However, 
for those that experience problems with mentalizing their self-copresence and mentalizing 
abilities can affect instructor satisfaction beyond perceptions of anthropomorphism. Figure 6 
shows that when individuals struggle more with mentalizing, they report lower instructor 
satisfaction when their self-copresence is high. Based on the theory of executive dysfunction 
those that struggle with mentalizing, or mental flexibility, typically experience difficulty 
controlling the flow of information from multiple sources (Mackinlay et al., 2006; Rajendran et 
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al., 2011; Logie et al., 2011; Woodbury-Smith & Volkmar, 2009). Participants fixed on one a 
task, perhaps perceiving themselves, will have trouble moving to another. Processing another 
entity in an online setting can prove to be more difficult for those with mentalizing deficits. 
Therefore, increasing self-copresence for those with mentalizing deficits decreases instructor 
satisfaction. 
Theoretical Implications 
           The concept of presence, despite the many varied conceptualizations, has been cited as an 
essential variable in perceived learning effectiveness (Lyons, et al.,2012; Wei & Chen, 2012; 
Weinel et al., 2011), learning interaction satisfaction (Wei & Chen, 2012), less stress when 
completing online tasks (Weinel et al., 2011) and perceptions of better learning performance 
(Lyons et al., 2012). However, as this study indicates a person's ability to mentalize and switch 
attention effectively moderates this effect. This study shows that when participants struggle in 
these areas and self-copresence is low, instructor effectiveness is higher. Therefore, less self-
copresence serves as a positive predictor of instructor satisfaction for those with difficulties 
associated with ASD.  
           Social skills did have a significant main effect on perceptions of instructor satisfaction. 
Participants in the study that scored higher on the social skills scale reported lower levels of 
instructor satisfaction. The participants that score higher on social skills are those that express 
greater trouble with social interaction. The results for this main effect should be included in 
future research to understand the relationship between social skills and instructor satisfaction.  
           The results from this study show that creating learning environments with the notion that 
increased copresence is best, may not be effective for all students. This study is just the first step 
in understanding the types of avatars that influence perceptions of anthropomorphism, 
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homophily, and copresence for those with ASD. The findings from this study contribute to a 
better understanding of the mechanisms that affect the atypical processing of visual information 
and can inform better intervention and education programs.  
Study Limitations 
There are limitations to this study that influence the interpretation of the findings. First, 
this study used an all-male sample; this was systematic and was decided based on previous 
research findings regarding the use of the Autism Spectrum Quotient. However, this does limit 
the interpretations made from this work. The findings do show that males may require less self 
and other-copresence in mediated learning with an avatar. Increased self and other-copresence 
may be beneficial for females. Previous research has shown that males and females with ASD 
present differently and thereby there needs for copresence may vary as well. Future work should 
include females as both the instructor and student to compare and contrast those results with the 
findings from this study. Women present differently than men on the autism spectrum, and thus 
the results may vary for them. Women may prefer a greater sense of presence in learning 
interactions.  
The Autism Spectrum Quotient captures the degree to which an individual identifies with 
the autistic phenotype. However, as this study indicates, and others before it (Palmer et al., 2014; 
Rourke & McGloin, 2019), this is not a unidimensional construct. The three-factor solution 
proposed by this work is consistent with other studies that have tested the AQ factor structure 
(Rourke & McGloin, 2019). Furthermore, there is a male bias that is present in the current 
measure that makes it difficult to capture how females vary. Individuals on the autism spectrum 
vary on each of these dimensions, and women specifically show different results. Future 
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researchers should examine these sub-dimensions and develop a more robust tool that will more 
accurately capture females and males that identify with this phenotype.  
Next, because this study only recruited male participants and the avatars both used a male voice, 
the effect for this variable may be different if female participants were included in the sample. 
The participants may have felt they were similar to the avatar based on gender matching. 
Therefore, future studies should include both male and female participants, as well as 
instructors.  
           Finally, this study used information about the environmental protection agency. 
Participants and instructors may find that increased social potential and presence are more 
effective with different objectives or goals in mind. The goals set out for this study were clear in 
trying to identify the need for increased social presence when task-related information was 
present. Future studies could look at the importance of increased social potential and copresence 
when the focus is on social skills training or group learning. Finally, research in mediated 
education could benefit from an exploration into a broader range of design variables for all 
individuals that have trouble in processing and responding to multiple streams of information. 
Conclusion 
The growing population of individuals with an ASD diagnosis and attention deficit 
disorders, demands that researchers consider this unique population when investigating 
communication processes and technology use. Previous research has not yet addressed the 
differences that exist for information processing within this specific population. Finally, this area 
of research creates many opportunities to develop interventions utilizing mediated 
communication. Individuals with ASD typically struggle with detecting and interpreting social 
cues, but avatars and repetitive mediated interactions may help to develop these skills. Engineers 
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and researchers in robotics have provoked social behaviors using robots for interaction. Research 
in mediated communication and avatars could make these types of interventions more cost-
effective and accessible for those with ASD. Researchers acknowledge that a "universally 
usable" interface focused on the abilities of special needs users may lead to interfaces that are 
easier to use for the benefit of all users (Schneiderman, 2000). The findings from this study, and 
future communication studies, including those with ASD, could inform better design for 
intervention programs and applications targeting social skills and development as well as 
education. 
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Appendicies 
Appendix A:  Study Stimuli 
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Appendix B: Avatar Script 
 
On Feb 15th, 2017 
Just barely a month into the 115th Congress—Republicans held an oversight hearing in the 
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works (EPW) titled, “Modernization of the 
Endangered Species Act.” Of course, anyone who has followed Congress in recent years knows 
that this is simply a politically clever way of describing what will in reality be a hearing to 
discuss how to weaken or repeal the Endangered Species Act altogether.  
Why is this important?  
The Endangered Species Act has lists of protected plant and animal species both nationally and 
worldwide. As of October 2009, 1,361 plants and animals in the United States were listed as 
threatened or endangered. There are many additional species that are currently being evaluated 
for possible protection under the ESA.  
Whether or not a species is listed as endangered or threatened then depends on a number of 
factors, including the urgency and whether adequate protections exist through other means. 
 Has a large percentage of the species vital habitat been degraded or destroyed?  
 Has the species been over-consumed by commercial, recreational, scientific or 
 educational uses?  
 Is the species threatened by disease or predation?  
 Do current regulations or legislations inadequately protect the species?  
 Are there other manmade factors that threaten the long-term survival of the species? 
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If scientific research reveals that the answer to one or more of the above questions is yes, then 
the species can be listed under the Endangered Species Act. 
 Once a species becomes listed as "endangered" or "threatened," it receives special 
protections by the federal government.  Animals are protected from “take” or being traded or 
sold. A listed plant is protected if on federal property or if federal actions are involved, such as 
the issuing of a federal permit on private land. 
 The Endangered Species Act is very important, because it saves our native fish, plants 
and wildlife from going extinct. Once they are gone, they are gone forever and there is no going 
back. Losing even a single species can have disastrous impacts on the rest of the ecosystem, 
because the effects will be felt throughout the food chain. From providing cures to deadly 
diseases to maintaining natural ecosystems and improving overall quality of life, the benefits of 
preserving threatened and endangered species are invaluable. 
 Here are a few species that have been saved due to the endangered species act:  
 In the 1960s, a mere 500 bald eagles could be found soaring across America's lower 48 
states. By the late 1960's, only 400 breeding pairs of bald eagles were found in the lower 48 
states. The outlook was not good for our national symbol. Thanks to the protections afforded by 
the Endangered Species Act, bald eagle numbers have rebounded to more than 7,000 breeding 
pairs of bald eagles today.  
 A 1989 census indicated that the Florida panther population had dropped to between 30 
to 50 individuals. Today, the species population is still below 100 individuals, but without 
Endangered Species Act protections the panther would likely be extinct.  
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 Gray wolves once ranged across the entire North American continent. However, by the 
mid-20th century, only a few hundred of the species remained in the entire lower 48 states. 
Today, thanks to Endangered Species Act protections, more than 2,500 wolves reside in 
Minnesota, roughly 500 wolves in Wisconsin and Michigan and another 500 individuals in 
western states.  
These are just a few of the animals that have been saved from extinction. Many more plants and 
animals can be saved with continued support of this vital act.  
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Appendix C: Pretest Avatars 
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Appendix D: Pretest Questionnaire 
 
Anthropomorphism   
Nowak, 2006 
Seven point Likert scale.  
1. This image looks human  
2. This image has human features 
3. This image has human-like expressions 
4. This image is life-like 
5. This mage looks very realistic 
6. This image looks very cartoon like 
 
Masculinity and Femininity  
Seven point Likert scale.  
1. This avatar looks masculine  
2. This avatar loos feminine  
 
Realism  
Nowak, Hamilton, & Hammond, 2009 
Four bipolar adjectives on a seven point interval: 
1. Real to Not Real  
2. Cartoon-like to Photorealistic 
3. Natural to Artificial  
4. Possible to Impossible (in response to: ‘‘Do you think this image could possibly exist 
outside the computer screen.’’). 
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Appendix E: Tables 
Table 1 Pretest Descriptives 
 N M SD SE 
95% Confidence Interval for Mean 
Lower Bound           Upper Bound 
ANTHRO 1 177 5.95 .677 .051 5.85 6.05 
2 177 2.81 .850 .064 2.69 2.94 
3 180 2.25 .987 .074 2.10 2.39 
4 180 3.33 1.242 .093 3.15 3.51 
Total 714 3.58 1.711 .064 3.45 3.70 
        
REAL 1 175 3.09 .971 .073 2.95 3.24 
2 175 5.64 1.094 .083 5.47 5.80 
3 177 2.68 .946 .071 2.54 2.82 
4 177 3.00 .930 .070 2.86 3.13 
Total 704 3.60 1.539 .058 3.48 3.71 
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Table 2 
Multiple Comparisons of Avatar Anthropomorphism 
(I) Avatar (J) Avatar Mean Difference 
(I-J) 
SE p  
        95% CI 
               LL              UL 
Human  Manatee             3.1   .102 .000               2.86           3.14 
Dolphin             3.7   .102 .000               3.43           3.97 
Gorilla             2.6   .102 .000               2.35           2.89 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit. 
 *p < .001  
Table 3 
Multiple Comparisons of Avatar Realism  
(I) Avatar (J)Avatar Mean Difference  
         (I-J) 
SE p       95 % CI 
         LL              UL 
Human  Manatee          -2.5 .106 .000        -2.82         -2.26     
 Dolphin            .41 .105 .001            .13            .69 
 Gorilla            .10 .105 1.0           -.18           .38 
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit.  
*p = .001 
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Table 4:  
Scale Means, Standard Deviations, and Inter-item Correlations 
Factor  Item  r M SD Factor  Item  r M SD 
Social Skills    3.9 .25 Homophily   3.9 .02 
 AQ15 .56    HOM2 .60   
 AQ17 .73    HOM3 .46   
 AQ22 .45    HOM4 .45   
 AQ26 .45    HOM5 .59   
 AQ38 .80    HOM7 .60   
 AQ44 .76        
 AQ47 .74   Other Co Presence   4.2 .03 
      OCOP1 .64   
Attention  
Switching  
     OCOP2 .65   
  3.5 .08  OCOP7 .73   
 AQ10 .66    OCOP8 .75   
 AQ25 .56    OCOP10 .71   
 AQ32 .68    OCOP11 .59   
 AQ34 .45    OCOP1 .64   
 AQ37 .61        
     Self Co Presence   4.5 .01 
Mentalizing    3.2 .10  SRCOP1 .53   
 AQ3 .47    SRCOP2 .75   
 AQ8 .58    SRCOP3 .79   
 AQ14 .51    SRCOP4 .76   
 AQ27 .66    SRCOP5 .74   
 AQ31 .55    SRCOP1 .53   
 AQ36 .58        
 AQ40 .56   Instructor  
Satisfaction 
  
 AQ50 .54     4.0 .04 
 AQ36 .58    INEFF1 .57   
      INEFF2 .65   
Anthropomorphis
m 
  3.7 .14  INEFF3 .79   
 ANTHRO1 .84    INEFF4 .73   
 ANTHRO2 .78    INEFF5 .61   
 ANTHRO3 .67    INEFF6 .73   
 ANTHRO4 .72    INEFF7 .59   
 ANTHRO5 .85    INEFF8 .73   
 ANTHRO1 .84        
 ANTHRO2 .78        
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Table 5 
ANOVA Results for AQ 
Predictor 
 
Sum 
of 
Squares 
df 
 
   Mean Square 
 
F 
 
   p 
 
AQSS Between Groups 111.01 1 111.01 98.28 .000 
Within Groups 454.09 402     1.13   
Total 565.10 403  
 
  
AQAS Between Groups 58.98 1   58.98 54.72 .000 
Within Groups 433.30 402     1.08   
Total 492.28 403  
 
  
AQMENT Between Groups 59.76 1   59.76 72.54 .000 
Within Groups 329.56 400        .82   
Total 389.32 401  
 
  
 
 
 
Table 6       
Comparisons of ASD Participants and Non ASD on AQ 
 
 
 
N 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
95 % CI 
LL              UL 
AQSS 191 -1 3.36 1.07           3.12          3.51 
 213 1 4.41 1.06           4.27          4.55 
      
AQAS 191 -1 3.10 .851 2.89          3.22 
 213 1 3.87 1.18 3.71          4.03 
      
AQMENT 191 -1 2.80 .789 2.69          2.91 
 211 1 3.57 1.00 3.44          3.71 
      
Note. CI = confidence interval; LL = lower limit, UL = lower limit.                                              
(-1 = No ASD, 1 = ASD diagnosis) 
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Table 7 
 
Means for DV’s by Condition 
Dependent Variable COND Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ANTHRO 1 3.273 .102 3.072 3.475 
2 3.955 .104 3.751 4.159 
HOM 1 3.735 .081 3.576 3.893 
2 3.976 .082 3.816 4.137 
SRCOP 1 4.401 .093 4.219 4.583 
2 4.517 .094 4.332 4.702 
OCOP 1 4.263 .086 4.094 4.433 
2 4.084 .087 3.913 4.256 
INSAT 1 3.913 .092 3.731 4.094 
2 4.051 .094 3.867 4.235 
 
 
 
 
Table 8a: 
  
Pairwise Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   ANTHRO   
(I) ASD (J) ASD 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.b 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
-1 1 -1.088* .142 .000 -1.368 -.809 
1 -1 1.088* .142 .000 .809 1.368 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no 
adjustments). 
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Table 8b:  
Pairwise Comparisons 
Dependent Variable:   ANTHRO   
(I) COND (J) COND 
Mean 
Difference (I-
J) Std. Error Sig.b 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Differenceb 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
1 2 -.741* .142 .000 -1.021 -.461 
2 1 .741* .142 .000 .461 1.021 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no 
adjustments). 
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Table 9 
Means for DV’s  by Diagnosis 
Dependent Variable ASD Mean Std. Error 
95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
ANTHRO -1 3.108 .103 2.906 3.311 
1 4.120 .103 3.917 4.323 
HOM -1 3.869 .081 3.710 4.028 
1 3.842 .081 3.682 4.002 
SRCOP -1 4.153 .093 3.970 4.336 
1 4.765 .094 4.581 4.949 
OCOP -1 4.163 .087 3.992 4.333 
1 4.185 .087 4.014 4.356 
INSAT -1 4.060 .093 3.878 4.243 
1 3.903 .093 3.720 4.086 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10  
          
Correlation Matrix            
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. AQ -          
2. COND -.00 -         
3. AQAS .35** -.07 -        
4. AQSS .44** -.01 .59** -       
5. AQMENT .39** -.05 .72** .51** -      
6. ANTHRO .35** .24** -.00 .21** -.03 -     
7. HOM - .00 .11* -.10* .04 -.17** .15** -    
8. SRCOP .24** .07 .03 .18** .01 .40** .00 -   
9. OCOP .04 -.05 -.21** -.10* -.18** .19** .13** -.11* -  
10.  -.04 .07 -17** -21** -11* -.01 .15** -.30** .57** - 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 tailed) 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2 tailed) 
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Appendix F: Figures 
Figure 1: Hypothesis 1  
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Figure 2: Hypothesis 2a 
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Figure 3: Hypothesis 2b  
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Figure 4: Hypothesis 3 
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Figure 5: Hypothesis 4a 
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Figure 6: Hypothesis 4c 
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Figure 7: Hypothesis 6a  
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Figure 8: Hypothesis 6c 
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Figure 9: Hypothesis 8a 
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Figure 10: Hypothesis 8c 
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